10th Fleet, met with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) leadership, faculty and students the week of May 11 to discuss evolving graduate education designed to prepare tomorrow's cyber leaders. /Keywords (Cybersecurity, Spectrum, Telecommunications, Wireless) Another potential military-intelligence loophole concerns the design and development of cyber capabilities.
Official Texts - Cyber Defence - NATO Library at NATO Library Yet, as emphasized by the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute (NUPI), given the high degree of secrecy around these issues, we do not know the division of labor between PST [Police Security Service], NSM [National Security Authority] and the Intelligence Service here, but it can be demanding to maintain concrete and formal distinctions between acquisition, impact operations, and security measures in the digital space. 15 Days to slow the spread as outlined by the White House and CDC. The sinew of maneuver across all domains is the network. The agency will therefore establish a branch in Rennes with the goal of bringing it closer to the major institutional players associated with the Ministry of Defense, starting with COMCYBER (Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale Citation2019, 29). /Resources 10 0 R Depending on how this is done and interpreted, it can qualify as an offensive cyber operation. The responsibilities of the agency include coordinating of the national cyber defense strategy, protecting state information networks,Footnote10 regulating critical infrastructure and the private sector, certifying products, and hosting the national Computing Emergency Response Team. Lawrence Michelon, a senior electronics engineer for the Systems Design and Integration Branch at Carderocks Combatant Craft Division in Norfolk, receives the Rear Adm. George W. Melville Award for engineering excellence at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Honor Awards ceremony Aug. 1, 2017, in West Bethesda, Md. In the following, the three first of these are deployed as starting points for examining the organization of French cyber capabilities. 111th Congress (2009-2010), Senate Bill 3480 (S.3480). /Filter /FlateDecode 9 These operations are based on 2017 Intelligence and Security Services Act and are not conducted as military operations. As part of the intelligence community, the MIVD is placed under the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense.Footnote8 In addition, the MIVD does not conduct military operations.
(PDF) Cyber Threats in Civil Aviation - ResearchGate Giving more thought to the organizing of offensive cyber capabilities - and its entanglements - would equip scholars and decision makers to better engage the discussion of when and whether a warfare, competition, or intelligence framework is the most suitable for cyberspace. Controlling almost half of the gasoline, jet fuel and diesel flowing along the East Coast of the US turn off the spigot (David and Perlroth Citation2021). Note: According to Section 1.4 Transition Plan of the new instruction, the old DoDI 5000.02 dated Jan 7, 2015 (Change 3 dated 10 Aug 2017) has been renumbered to DoDI 5000.02T. TENTH Fleet,CHIPS Magazine) /Rect [0.0 763.81604 612.0 792.0] Instead, it aims for the empirical analysis to provoke and open up academic and policy discussions on the practical, political, and democratic implications of the organizational aspect of developing and deploying cyber capabilities, while keeping in mind its entanglements. /Contents 13 0 R /Filter /FlateDecode This article advances this debate by undertaking a comparative analysis of how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities. This strand of literature is focused on cyber defense arrangements and does not speak directly to the organizing of offensive cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities. They argue that strategic outcomes in, through and from cyberspace are possible short of war (Michael and Harknett Citation2020, 1). /Rotate 0 It describes both intelligence and military cyber operations as offensive actions, notes that they are usually carried out in the network of the opponent, and stresses that their execution falls under the responsibility of the chief of the intelligence service (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2014, 6 and 17). Accordingly, cybersecurity research is increasingly guided by the empirical reality of persistent cyber operations across the conflict spectrum (Cavelty and Wenger Citation2020, 16). /ProcSet [/PDF /Text /ImageB /ImageC /ImageI]
(POSTED: May 24, 2022) The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps climate strategy, Climate Action 2030, setsthe Department of the Navy (DON) on a path to achieve the Nations commitment to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, while becoming a more capable, agile, and lethal fighting force. The analysis of the Dutch organization of cyber capabilities shows organizational separation between the DCC which can deploy cyber capabilities in the event of armed conflict and war and the intelligence services that can deploy cyber capabilities for intelligence and active defense purposes. /Length 186 Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales on 5 September 2014. /Kids [4 0 R 5 0 R 6 0 R] It improves operational effectiveness and provides a mechanism to enhance integration and resource development. It then examines the organization of cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities in the Netherlands, France, and Norway. It stresses that the difference between the conduct of cyber operations in war and for espionage relates to the purpose and the desired effect and underlines that those cyber capabilities are complementary and non-competing (Defence Cyber Command Citation2019, 1415). 3523) (7 May 2012), Republic of Estonia, Office of the President (12 April 2012), James A. LEWIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies (February 16, 2012). Third, we have witnessed an expansion of intelligence activities beyond traditional espionage, with tasks and responsibilities ranging from protecting government networks to executing offensive cyber operations abroad (Gioe, Goodman, and Stevens Citation2020). This is not least important in the context of a new EU Strategic Compass that aims at expanding the unions capacity to tackle cyber threats, disinformation and foreign interference (European Union External Action Service Citation2022, 7), and a new Strategic Concept for NATO stating that cyberspace is contested at all times. The MIVD and JSCU are therefore crucial partners for the DCC. There is hence a risk that many of the challenges to collaboration are internalized. We use cookies to improve your website experience. 5 Howick Place | London | SW1P 1WG. /Version /1.5 It is a significant factor for
August DEFENSE CYBERSECURITY - Government Accountability Office The Department of Defense's enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identified three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday shares his navigation plan for how the U.S. Navy will continue to support U.S. maritime objectives as part of a Joint Force. As an arctic and maritime nation, U.S. economic and security interests require the Navy to work closely with U.S. interagency and foreign maritime partners to safeguard access and exploitation of Arctic resources. /Creator (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,U.S. Arguably, the strict French division between defensive and offensive measures is being challenged by increased coordination and collaboration across defense, intelligence, and military institutions. The Cyber Defense is responsible for conducting defensive cyber operations, and the Intelligence Service coordinates between offensive and defensive cyber operations. 3 0 obj While the collaboration between ANSSI, COMCYBER, and the French intelligence services is hence likely to increase, neither the desired outcome of the collaboration nor its strategic and practical dimensions are explicated. The "Blueprint" for a coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at the Union level. Cybersecurity scholarship has also investigated the organization of both military cyber entities (Pernik Citation2020, Smeets Citation2019) and offensive cyber capabilities (Smeets 2018). People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read. Photo: Defense Dept. Exploring Cyber Security Controversies in the Case of WannaCry, Governance of Cyber Warfare in The Netherlands: an Exploratory Investi- Gation, Commission du Livre blanc sur la dfense et la scurit nationale, Separation of Offensive and Defensive Functions: The Originality of the French Cyberdefense Model Called into Question, Decision-Making and Parliamentary Control for International Military Cyber Operations by The Netherlands Armed Forces, Cyberarmes: La Lutte Informatique Offensive Dans la Manaeuvre Future, Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research, Weaving Tangled Webs: offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace. The United States is an Arctic nation, and the Coast Guard supports numerous experienced and capable partners in the region. Aerial drones are increasingly being repurposed for domestic use and legislated for public and commercial purposes around the world. Photo: Navy. NATO Headquarters Fourth, the findings shed additional light on our understanding of how the blurring of boundaries between war and peace, military and civilian, and internal and external security, identified in security studies in the past decades, looks in the cyber domain (Christensen and Liebetrau Citation2019). Experts review the Department of the Navy's cybersecurity posture. Report to Congress on the annual long-range plan for construction of naval vessels for fiscal year 2020 prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC BY license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The organizational separation contains multiple ambiguities. These elements hold the promise to decrease the risks that operational capability and activity are mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, and that political decision-making is hampered, and democratic oversight is disadvantaged. A related, yetalternative, argument is brought forward by supporters of cyber persistence theory. Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval and Marine War Colleges, along with a fresh look at the relationships with civilian academic institutions and corporate learning structures. This article provides a first step in closing that gap by offering a dedicated perspective on the organization of offensive cyber capabilities across three European countries. JSCU is a collaboration between the two Dutch intelligence and security services the MIVD and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). Taillat (Citation2019) finds the ambiguity to be partly deliberate, but stresses how it brings to light the resulting loopholes when attempting to draw organizational boundaries in a new context of operations. Fri: 10:00 - 15:30, Author(s): Marrone, Alessandro; Sabatino, Ester, Author(s): Pawlak, Patryk; Tikk, Eneken ; Kerttunen, Mika, Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, November 2019, Estonian Information System Authority, 2019, NATO Research Task Group (RTG) IST-152 Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defense and Resilience (March 2018), U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM, March 2018, Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale, 12 fvrier 2018. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliances core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. As part of this clarification, the strategic review formalizes four operational cyber chains and consolidates their governance. >> 138 0 obj
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The paper concludes that there is a need for increased political attention and a deliberate approach to how the organizational model allows for the operational cyber capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which political implications at both national and international levels. One part of the answer can be traced to the 2014 internal guideline for information security and the conduct of cyber operations in the defense (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2014). Secretary of the Navy, Year 3 strategic vision, goals, and implementation guidance FY2020-2023. Council of the European Union (19 June 2017), Council of the European Union (7 June 2017), European Commission - Fact sheet (6 July 2016), Council conclusions on cyber diplomacy (11 February 2015), Council of the European Union (1718 November 2014), European Commission - High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (7 February 2013), European Union - European External Action Service (7 February 2013).
Full article: Organizing cyber capability across military and The release of this strategic plan marks the five-year anniversary of Navy Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet. They suggest that strategy must be unshackled from the presumption that it deals only with the realm of coercion, militarised crisis, and war in cyberspace (Harknett and Smeets Citation2022, 2). This scholarship is, however, guided by crafting conceptual frameworks (Smeets 2018, Citation2019) or mapping the development of cyber commands (Pernik Citation2020). Following the same line of thinking, this article offers a comparative exploratory qualitative analysis (Yin Citation2014) of how the development and deployment of cyber capabilities are structured across military cyber commands and foreign intelligence services in the Netherlands, France, and Norway. In the face of a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. The head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command may soon be two different jobs and the Defense Department will have a new "joint unified . endstream stream
>> The strategy directs follow-on implementation efforts for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps counterparts to identify initiatives to be a modern, lethal, agile force that can fight and win anywhere in the world. The final section concludes and offers recommendations for future academic and policy debate and design. While much of the US-driven academic debate has focused on if and how cyber operations reach the threshold of war, this paper focuses on the organizing of offensive capabilities between military and intelligence in Europe. LAAD Defence & Security 11 - 14 Apr 2023 | Rio de Janeiro - RJ, . Second, neither consistency in organizational collaboration, separation, nor centralization will automatically translate into efficient operational cyber capabilities to be deployed in intelligence contest, strategic competition, or military confrontation. >> The deliberate design and standup of this command came at a good time in history. However, it is unclear whether decision makers have systematically assessed how the organizational model allows for the operational capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which strategic and governance implications. DGSE is the most important service in this regard. Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00
Author (s): Pernik, Piret.
Cybersecurity and defence for the future of Europe - EUobserver NATO Headquarters Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. This document provides a discussion of how Naval Aviation leadership intends to support "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," and is aligned to the Chief of Naval Operations' guidance, "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority," and the Commandant of the Marine Corps' "FRAGO 01/2016: Advance to Contact." The capability and competence in offensive cyber operations is to be further developed (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2020, 118). The French Military Cyber Strategy that so far consists of three separate documents: the Ministerial Policy for Defensive Cyber Warfare, the Public Elements for the Military Cyber Warfare Doctrine, and the Public Elements for Cyber Influence Warfare Doctrine (Ministre des Armeses Citation2019a, Citation2019b, Citation2021) does, however, not elaborate on the collaboration between the COMCYEBR and the intelligence services. In this document, we outline how our Navy will develop leaders who demonstrate operational excellence, strong character, and resilience through community at every level of seniority. Today (16 February 2017), NATO and Finland stepped up their engagement with the signing of a Political Framework Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation. Following the 2012 long-term plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces, the guideline notes that the Norwegian armed forces must have the capacity for offensive cyber operations (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2014, 13). The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities is likely to be explained by multiple factors, including strategic posture, military culture, economic and human resources, and political will and attention. NATO and the European Union work together to counter cyber threats, Deputy Secretary General stresses NATO will continue to increase Ukraines cyber defences, NATO and North Macedonia strengthen responses to cyber threats, NATO helps to strengthen Mongolia's cyber defence capacity, Deputy Secretary General at CYBERSEC: NATO is adapting to respond to cyber threats, New NATO hub will gather the Alliance's cyber defenders, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Cybersecurity : A Generic Reference Curriculum, Cyber - the good, the bad and the bug-free. Naval Surface Force has developed its "Surface Force Strategy" which describes the return to sea control and implementation of Distributed Lethality. Register to receive personalised research and resources by email. In the past decade, the defense cybersecurity strategies of the Netherlands have displayed the nations ambition to develop offensive cyber capabilities (Bunk and Smeets Citation2021; Claver Citation2018). /Author (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,U.S. The Naval Research and Development Framework outlines processes for speeding new technologies from basic research into finished products, and into Sailor or Marine hands.
(PDF) Cyber Defense: An International View - ResearchGate Organizing cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities is only one of many related components in long-term defense planning.
The Concept of Cyber Defence Exercises (CDX): Planning, Execution The Ministry states that the ability to carry out offensive cyber operations depends on a very good understanding of the target. endstream
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The vision is anchored on a three-pronged approach of readiness, capability and capacity, and spans all aviation-related platforms and weapons. (POSTED: October 19, 2022) The Cyberspace Superiority Vision charts the Department of the Navys (DON) pursuit of cyberspace superiority guided by three principles: Secure, Survive, and Strike. it is, according to the Ministry of Defense, neither necessary nor desirable to create a cyber command outside the Intelligence Service. It has been more than a decade since France made cyberwar a national security priority and mandated the development of defensive and offensive cyber capabilities (Commission du Livre blanc sur la dfense et la scurit nationale Citation2008). Yet, the review does not elaborate on when, how, or in collaboration with whom. It is hence clear that the competence to deploy cyber capabilities for both intelligence and military ends lies solely with the foreign intelligence service. BAE Systems is developing cyber defense capabilities to help aircraft detect and mitigate cyber attacks in real time. The 2017 Navy Program Guide describes the platforms, payloads, systems and technologies already fielded, and those being developed. Educating the civil aviation workforce . Today (16 February 2017), NATO and Finland stepped up their engagement with the signing of a Political Framework Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation. /Annots [14 0 R 15 0 R 16 0 R 17 0 R 18 0 R 19 0 R 20 0 R 21 0 R 22 0 R 23 0 R << DOD Cybersecurity Campaign. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. 7 The Joint Sigint and Cyber Unit (JSCU). /Length 491 The Ministry of Defense (ibid) stresses that it will further develop the Intelligence Services ability to counter threats before incidents occur and emphasize that that cooperation and coordination between the above-mentioned actors in military cyber operations [the intelligence service and the FOH] will be strengthened, based on a military cyber operations center in the Intelligence Service. It was prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities (OPNAV N9) and approved for release by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. /MediaBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] In recent years, the DGSE has become more open about its work, but it remains a very secretive service (Chopin Citation2017: 546). The Norwegian organization of cyber capabilities is founded on a centralized model that dissolves the organizational distinction between military and intelligence entities. While our work is far from complete, the following report highlights progress made and areas demanding our greatest focus to ensure success. This applies to coping with the challenges of persistent cyber conflict short of war as well as the application of cyber operations in armed conflict. This not only makes it difficult to select and impact targets, but it also makes it hard to attract and maintain the necessary human skills (Smeets Citation2021). Such embattled nations may find individual cyber-safety even more salient in light of the increased global tendency towards military cyberwarfare ( Baram, 2017; Cohen et al., 2016 ). 230 0 obj
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NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. 11 0 obj European Parliament, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), PE 603.175, May 2017. Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities (NATO Citation2022 Strategic Concept, 5). At the time of writing, there is no public information that the DCC has conducted offensive cyber operations.
Early Assessment of Drone Fleet Defence in Depth Capabilities for TENTH Fleet - May 18, 2015 MONTEREY, Calif. - Vice Adm. Jan E. Tighe, commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. However, the Ministry does not elaborate on how the coordination between the intelligence service and the operational headquarters plays out or what it exactly entails. In military operations the Intelligence Service coordinates the activity with the Armed Forces operational headquarters (FOH). Cyber Defence: Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive and coercive, and are becoming ever more frequent. Cyber Strategy Fourth, in the US context, we have seen continuous debate about the dual-hat arrangement concerning the NSA and the US Cyber Command (Chesney Citation2020; Demchak Citation2021), and Lindsay (Citation2021) has recently examined and criticized the organization of the US Cyber Command. Why does Norway not have a standalone cyber command? /Annots [35 0 R 36 0 R 37 0 R 38 0 R 39 0 R 40 0 R 41 0 R 42 0 R 43 0 R 44 0 R Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00 objective to transition to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. /Length 260
Navy Emphasizing Maritime Cybersecurity Investments The attack made Colonial Pipeline a company. First, the ANSSI can respond to a computer attack affecting the national security of France by carrying out the technical operations necessary to characterize the attack and neutralize its effects by accessing the information systems that are at the origin of the attack (Gry Citation2020).